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JANKOV-STYLE FORMULAS AND
REFUTATION SYSTEMS
A b s t r a c t. The paper studies the logics which algebraic se-
mantics comprises of the Hilbert algebras endowed with additional
operations - the regular algebras. With any ﬁnite subdirectly irre-
ducible regular algebra one can associate a Jankov formula. In its
turn, the Jankov formulas can be used as anti-axioms for a refu-
tation system. It is proven that a logic has a complete refutation
system based on Jankov formulas if and only if this logic enjoys
ﬁnite model property. Also, such a refutation system is ﬁnite,
that is, it contains a ﬁnite number of axioms and anti-axioms, if
and and only if the logic is tabular.
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.1 Introduction
In 1952 J. Lukasiewicz suggested [8] the following refutation system:
antiaxiom  p and rules modus tollens
 B, (A → B)/  B (MT)
and reverse substitution
 σ(A)/  A. (RS)
He proved that all classically invalid formulas are refutable by means of this
refutation system (the system is complete) and no classically valid formula
can be refuted (the system is consistent). The sketch of the proof is as
follows.
1. Completeness: if a formula A is not derivable in classical propositional
calculus (CPC) then there exists such a substitution σ of formulas
(p → p) and (p∧¬p) for propositional variables that  σ(A) → (p∧¬p)
and, hence,  σ(A) → p. Application of rules MT and RS completes
the proof.
2. Consistency: since classical logic is closed under rules Modus Ponens
and substitution, it is impossible to refute any classically valid formula
by rules MT and RS.
In order to use a similar approach for intermediate logics (or normal
extensions of S4) we need to ﬁnd ”a replacement” for formulas representing
logical constants. In the case when logic enjoys the ﬁnite model property
(f.m.p.) instead of formulas-constants one can use the Jankov formulas.
Let say L is an intermediate (or normal modal) logic and A = {A1,A2, ...}
is a characteristic set of ﬁnite subdirectly irreducible (f.s.i.) algebras, i.e.
every formula from L is valid in every algebra from A, while if A /∈ L
then A is invalid in at least one algebra from A 1. Let A be a formula
refutable in Ai and Ci be a Jankov formula of Ai. Instead of substituting
variables with (p → p) and (p ∧ ¬p) as we did for CPC, we will ﬁnd (see
Theorem 3.1) such a substitution σ that  σ(A) → Ci. If  Ci is an
antiaxiom, then  A can be derived from  σ(A) → Ci by (MT) and
1The most famous such a set for intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) is, of
course, the set of Jas´kowski matrices.
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(RS). This means that the system 〈{ Ci ; i ∈ I} ; MT,RS〉 is a complete
consistent refutation system [10, 12, 11]. Moreover, if L is tabular, that is
L has a ﬁnite characteristic set of f.s.i. algebras, there is a ﬁnite complete
set of antiaxioms. For instance, characteristic set for CPC consists of one
algebra, namely, 2-element Boolean algebra whose characteristic formula is
(¬p → p), which is classically equivalent to p.
In order to be able to construct Jankov formulas for ﬁnite s.i. algebras
we need only implication properly coordinated with congruences. In the
Section 2 we introduce and study the class of algebras (that we call ”’regu-
lar”’) which are Hilbert algebras [3] with additional compatible2 operations.
In Section 3 we will see how one can construct Jankov formulas for regular
algebras and we will prove the Jankov theorem for Jankov formulas of ﬁnite
s.i. regular algebras. And in the last section we will show how the Jankov
formulas can be used for constructing refutation systems.
.2 Regular Logics and Algebras
We will consider algebras in the signature {f0, f1, . . . , fn}, where f0 is →
and f1 is 1. Let us recall (e.g. [3]) the following deﬁnition of Hilbert
algebra3.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An algebra A = 〈A,→,1〉 is called Hilbert algebra if
→ satisﬁes the regular axioms for implication:
1. x → (y → x) = 1;
2. (x → (y → z)) → ((x → y) → (x → z)) = 1;
3. if x → y = y → x = 1, then x = y;
4. x → 1 = 1.
Since in any Hilbert algebra the identity x → x = 1 holds (e.g. [9, Ch.2
(3)]), condition 3 of the above Deﬁnition is equivalent to the following:
x = y if and only if x → y = y → x = 1
2See [1, 2].
3In [9] Hilbert algebras are called “positive implication algebras”.
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.
A subset F of the elements of Hilbert algebra A is called implicative
ﬁlter if
1. 1 ∈ F
2. a, a → b ∈ F yields b ∈ F.
If a ∈ A is an element, by [a) we denote an implicative ﬁlter generated
by element a, that is, [a) = {b; a → b = 1}. If A is an algebra and θ is
a congruence on A then by aθ we denote a congruence class containing
element a (and often we will omit index when no confusion arises).
All facts regarding Hilbert algebras that we will be using can be found
in [3, 9]. We will need the following properties of Hilbert algebras.
Proposition 2.1. Let A be a Hilbert algebra and F ⊆ A be an implica-
tive ﬁlter. Then the following holds
(a) 1 → a = a (e.g. [9, 2.3 (10)]);
(b) The relation θ such that a ≡ b if and only if a → b, b → a ∈ F is a
congruence on A (e.g. [9, 3.2 ]);
(c) If θ is a congruence on A then F(θ) = 1θ is an implicative ﬁlter
(e.g. [9, 3.1 ]);
(d) A relation a ≤ b if and only if a → b = 1 is a partial order on A (e.g.
[9, 2.2 ]) and 1 is the greatest relative to this order element.
Let A be an algebra and θ be a congruence on A. Let us observe that
c = d if and only if c → d, d → c ∈ F(θ). Indeed, by Deﬁnition 2.1(3)
c = d if and only if c → d = 1 and d → c = 1. The latter is
equivalent to c → d = 1 = F(θ) and d → c = F(θ), which is equivalent
to c → d, d → c ∈ F(θ). Thus, a congruence class F(θ) uniquely deﬁnes
the congruence. If F is a ﬁlter, then by θ(F) we will denote a congruence
induced by ﬁlter F. Clearly θ(F(θ)) = θ and F(θ(F)) = F. If a ∈ A then by
F(a) we denote a ﬁlter F of algebra A generated by a. A ﬁlter generated by
one element is called principal.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let K be a class of algebras. We say that K is a class
of regular algebras if
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(a) the {→,1}-reduct of each algebra A ∈ K is a Hilbert algebra;
(b) there is a formula R(p) such that F(a) = [R(a)) for every A ∈ K and
every a ∈ A.
We will say that an element a is R-stable if a = R(a). The condition (b)
of above deﬁnition means that every principal ﬁlter is a principal implicative
ﬁlter generated by some R-stable element.
The following propositions provide a natural and intrinsic characteriza-
tion of formula R.
Proposition 2.2. Let A be a (regular) algebra, a, b ∈ A and R(a) → b 
=
1A. Then there is a congruence θ such that aθ = 1A/θ, while bθ 
= 1A/θ.
Proof. Let θ = θ(R(a)). Then by Deﬁnition 2.2(b) we have F (θ) =
[R(a)), hence, b /∈ F (θ)), that is bθ 
= 1A/θ. 
To simplify notation, if (A → (B → C)) = 1 and (A → (C → B)) = 1
we will write (A → (B ↔ C)) = 1.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose V is a variety and R(p) is a formula. Then
the following conditions are equivalent
1. Condition (b) of Deﬁnition 2.2 holds;
2. For each algebra A ∈ V the following hold
(a) R(1) = 1;
(b) R(p) → p = 1;
(c) R(p) → R(R(p)) = 1;
(d) R(p → q) → (R(p) → R(q)) = 1;
(e) for each fundamental operation f(p1, . . . , pn) if for all i = 1, . . . , n
R(p) → (pi ↔ qi) = 1, then
R(p) → (f(p1, . . . , pn) ↔ f(q1, . . . , qn)) = 1;
3. For each algebra A ∈ V an implicative ﬁlter F of A is a ﬁlter of A if
and only if F is closed under R, that is, a ∈ F yields R(a) ∈ F.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2(a). {1} = F (1), hence, by Deﬁnition 2.2(b) R(1) ∈ {1}.
1 ⇒ 2(b). Straight from the deﬁnition of R.
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1 ⇒ 2(c). [R(a)) is a ﬁlter of algebra A, hence, by Deﬁnition 2.2(b), we
have [R(R(a))) = [R(a)).
1 ⇒ 2(d). For contradiction, assume R(p → q) → (R(p) → R(q)) 
= 1.
Then, by virtue of Proposition 2.2 (applied twice), we conclude that for
some congruence θ we have R(a → b)θ = 1a/θ and R(a)θ = 1a/θ, but
bθ 
= 1A/θ. On the other hand, by Deﬁnition 2.2(b) we get a → bθ =
1A/θ and aθ = 1A/θ. Thus, bθ = 1A/θ.
1 ⇒ 2(e). Immediately from the Deﬁnition 2.2: [R(a)) is a ﬁlter,
therefore [R(a)) deﬁnes such a congruence θ that b ≡ c(θ) if and only
if (b → c), (c → b) ∈ [R(a)).
2 ⇒ 3. Assume that F is a ﬁlter of A and a ∈ F. Then a ≡ 1(θ(F)).
Hence, R(a) ≡ R(1)(θ(F)). By 2.(a), R(1) = 1, therefore, we have R(a) ≡
1(θ(F)), that is R(a) ∈ F.
Conversely, let F be an implicative ﬁlter and F is closed under R. Then
by 2(e) F is a ﬁlter.
3 ⇒ 1. Straightforward. 
Remark 1. Let us point out that the regular algebras are diﬀerent from
pseudo-interior algebras (e.g. [1]) and the formula R(p), as we will see from
the examples, does not necessarily deﬁne a pseudo-interior operator p◦ (see
examples of pseudo-interior algebras and pseudo-interior operators in [2]).
On the other hand, the formula R(x → y) → (R(y → x) → z) is a ternary
deductive term [1], thus, any variety of regular algebras has equationally
deﬁnable principal congruences ([1][Corollary 2.5]).
Example 1. The following is a (not exhaustive) list of varieties of algebras
that have a formula satisfying (2.2).
• Hilbert algebras: R(p) = p;
• Brouwerian semilattices: R(p) = p;
• Brouwerian lattices: R(p) = p;
• Heyting algebras: R(p) = p;
• interior (S4) algebras: R(p) = p;
• monadic Heyting algebras: R(p) = p
• n-transitive algebras: R(p) = p ∧p ∧2p ∧ · · · ∧n−1p.
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Let us also observe that the properties of regular s.i. algebras are similar
to those of interior algebras. First, let us recall [5] that an algebra is
subdirectly irreducible if and only if it has either the only congruence, or
the smallest non-trivial congruence.
Proposition 2.4. A non-trivial regular algebra A is s.i. if and only if
it has the greatest distinct from 1 R-stable element.
Proof. By virtue of Proposition 2.3.3, the meet of any set of ﬁlters is
a ﬁlter. If an algebra A is s.i., the meet of all non-trivial (that is, distinct
from {1}) ﬁlters is a ﬁlter F ⊆ A. Since F is the smallest proper ﬁlter, F is a
principal ﬁlter. Assume that F = [a). Let us check that R(a) is the greatest
distinct from 1 R-stable element of A. From Proposition 2.3 it follows that
element a is R-stable. Let b ∈ A be a R-stable element and b 
= 1. Then
[R(b)) is a ﬁlter and [R(a)) ⊆ [R(b)). Hence, R(b) ≤ R(a). Thus, R(a) is
the greatest distinct from 1 R-stable element of A.
Conversely, if a is the greatest distinct from 1 R-stable element of A
then, by virtue of Proposition 2.3, ﬁlter [R(a)) is the smallest proper ﬁlter
of A. 
If A is an s.i. algebra, the element that generates the smallest non-
trivial ﬁlter, that is the greatest distinct from 1 R-stable element, we will
call an opremum and denote it by op(A).
The Proposition 2.3 suggests the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.3. A logic L in signature {→, f1, . . . , fm} we call regular
if the following axioms
A1. R(p) → p;
A2. R(p) → R(R(p));
A3. R(p → q) → (R(p) → R(q));
and the rules
A
R(A)
(RG)
R(p) → (q1 ↔ r1), . . . , R(p) → (qk ↔ rk)
R(p) → (fi(q1, . . . , qk) → fi(r1, . . . , rk)) (RE)
hold for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Let us note that (RE) is the requirement of compatibility of additional
operations [1]. Clearly, regular algebras are models for regular logics.
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.3 Characteristic Formulas of Finite Regular Algebras
From this point forward we consider an arbitrary but ﬁxed variety V of
regular algebras. And let L be a logic, corresponding to this variety, that
is, L is the set of all formulas valid in every algebra of V. If A is a formula
and A ∈ L we also will write  A. If D = {A1, . . . , Ak} is a set of formulas
and B is a formula by D ⇒ B we denote a formula R(A1) → (R(A2) →
(. . . (R(Ak) → R(B). . . ))). If A is a ﬁnite algebra then by Dg(A) we denote
a diagram set (cf. with diagram formula in [4, p. 442]): with each element
a ∈ A we associate a variable pa and we let Dg(A) be a set of all formulas
f(pa1 , . . . , pak) → pf(pa1 ,...,pak )
and
pf(pa1 ,...,pak ) → f(pa1 , . . . , pak)
for all fundamental operations f(p1, . . . , pk).
With each ﬁnite s.i. (regular) algebra A we associate a Jankov formula
in the following way (cf. [6]):
J(A) = Dg(A) ⇒ pop(A).
As we will see from the following theorem, the Jankov formulas of reg-
ular algebras enjoy the same properties as Jankov formulas of Heyting al-
gebras (cf. [7]).
Theorem 3.1. Let A be a f.s.i. algebra, B be an algebra and B be a
formula. Then
(Hom) if B  J(A), then A is (isomorphically) embeddable in some homo-
morphic image of B;
(Ded) if A  B, then there is such a substitution σ that  σ(B) ⇒ J(A).
Proof. (Hom) Let B  J(A) and ν be a refuting valuation. Then
applying multiple times Proposition 2.2, we can conclude that there is such
a congruence θ that ν(D) = 1B for all D ∈ Dg(A), while ν(pop(A) 
=
1B. Let us consider B
′ = B/θ and let ν be a natural extension of ν. Then
we have
ν(D) = 1B′ for all D ∈ Dg(A),
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while
ν(pop(A)) 
= 1B′ .
It is not hard to check that the mapping φ : a → ν(pa) is a homomorphism.
Let us observe that φ(op(A)) 
= 1B′ , hence, F(φ) = {1A}, thus, φ is an
isomorphism.
(Ded) Let A  B(p1, . . . , pk) and ν is a refuting valuation. Let σ :
pi → pν(pi) be a substitution and let B′ = σ(B). We want to prove that
 σ(B) → J(A). Assume the contrary:  σ(B) → J(A). Then for some
algebra B there is such a valuation μ that
μ(σ(B)) = 1B and μ(J(A)) 
= 1B. (3.1)
By virtue of (Hom), algebra A is embeddable in some homomorphic
image B′ of algebra B. Let φ : A → B′ be the embedding. Then if μ is a
natural extension of the valuation μ to B′, we have μ(σ(B)) 
= 1B′ and this
contradicts (3.1) (see Diag. 1).
pi
ai
pai
bi
bi
ν
σ
φ
μ
θμ
Diag. 1:

.4 Refutation Systems
In this section we study how Jankov formulas can be used in constructing
the refutation systems for regular logics.
Deﬁnition 4.1. If A is a formula then A+ and A− are meta-statements.
We will say that a meta-statement A+ is valid in logic L is A ∈ L. Accord-
ingly, a meta-statement A− is valid in L if A /∈ L.
We will use the following inference rules for refutation:
(A → B)+, B−
A−
, (MT)
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(σ(A))−
A−
, (RS)
where σ is any substitution, and
(R(A))−
A−
. (RG)
Deﬁnition 4.2. System 〈Ant;MT,RS,RG〉, where Ant is a set of the
negative meta-statements
{
A−i ; i ∈ I
}
(set of antiaxioms), is called a primi-
tive4 refutation system for L. Refutation system is called ﬁnite if it contains
only a ﬁnite number of antiaxioms.
Deﬁnition 4.3. (cf. [13, 14]) Let L be a logic, R be a refutation system.
The sequence of the meta-statements Aι11 , ..., A
ιk
k , where ιj ∈ {+,−} for all
j = 1, ..., k is called R-inference of the meta-statement Aιkk over L if for
each j = 1, ..., k one of the following hold
1. ιj is + and A
+
j is valid in logic L;
2. ιj is - and A
−
j is an antiaxiom;
3. ιj is - and A
−
j can be derived from the preceding meta-statements by
MT,RS or RG.
If there is a R-inference that ends with meta-statement A− we will say that
A− is R-derivable over L.
Refutation system R is complete for logic L if A− is R-derivable over
L for any A /∈ L. Refutation system R is consistent for logic L if for every
A ∈ L meta-statement A− is not R-derivable over L. If each antiaxiom of
refutations system R is (interderivable with) a Jankov formula, we will say
that R is a Jankov refutation system.
If L is a logic by Mod(L) we denote the class of all algebras that are
models for L, that is, all algebras in which each formula from L is valid. A
logic L is said to have a ﬁnite model property (f.m.p.) if for any formula
A /∈ L there is a ﬁnite algebra from Mod(L) in which formula A is not valid.
In this paper we consider only consistent refutation systems.
Proposition 4.1. If R = 〈{J(Ai)−; i ∈ I} ;MT,RS,RG〉 is a complete
Jankov refutation system for L, then Ai ∈ Mod(L) for all i ∈ I.
4Since here we consider only primitive refutation system the word “primitive” often
will be omitted.
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Proof. For contradiction, assume Ai /∈ Mod(L). Then there is such a
formula A that
A ∈ L and Ai  A. (4.1)
By virtue of Theorem 3.1 (Ded), there is a substitution σ such that
 σ(A) ⇒ J(Ai). (4.2)
Thus, the following sequence of meta-statements is a R-inference of A− (we
can apply consequently (MT), (RG) and (RS) to the ﬁrst two statements):
(σ(A) ⇒ J(Ai))+, J(Ai)−, R(σ(A))−, σ(A)−, A−
From the consistency of R it follows that A /∈ L. And the latter contradicts
(4.1). 
Lemma 4.2. Let logic L has a complete Jankov refutation system
R = 〈{J(Ai); i ∈ I} ;MT,RS,RG〉.
If meta-statement A− is R-derivable over L, then for some i ∈ I formula A
is invalid in algebra Ai.
Proof. Assume A− is R-derivable over L. Then there is a R-inference
of A− over L. We will prove our claim by induction on the length of this
R-inference.
Let Aι11 , ..., A
ιk
k be a R-inference of A
− over L. Thus, Aιkk = A
−.
Basis. If k = 1 then A− is an antiaxiom, hence, A = J(Ai) for some
i ∈ I and, therefore, A is invalid in Ai.
Let us assume that for all R-inferences of A− of length < k the statement
is true. Now let us consider a R-inference of length k. In this case the meta-
statement A− can be either antiaxiom, or be obtained from the preceding
meta-statements by (MT),(RS) or (RG). If A− is an antiaxiom then, as
we saw, A is not valid in one of the algebras Ai. Let us consider three
remaining possibilities.
Case of (MT). Assume A− is derived by (MT) and we need to
demonstrate that formula A is invalid in one of the algebras Ai. The fact
that A− was derived by (MT) means that for some 1 ≤ r, s < k we have
A+r = (A → B)+ and A−s = B−. Due to consistency of R, we get
(A → B) ∈ L. (4.3)
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According to the assumption formula B is invalid in some algebra Ai, that
is
Ai  B. (4.4)
Since (A → B) ∈ L and, by virtue of Proposition 4.1, Ai ∈ Mod(L), we
have
Ai  (A → B). (4.5)
From (4.4) and (4.5) it follows that Ai  A.
Case of RS. Assume A− is derived by (RS). It means that for some
1 ≤ r < k and some substitution σ we have A−r = σ(A). By assumption Ar,
and therefore σ(A), is invalid in some algebra Ai and, obviously, formula A
cannot be valid in Ai too.
Case of RG. Assume A− is derived by (RG). It means that for some
1 ≤ r < k we have A−r = R(A). By assumption R(A) is invalid in some
algebra Ai and, since R(1Ai) = 1Ai , formula A cannot be valid in Aj too.

Theorem 4.3. A logic L has a complete Jankov refutation system if
and only if L enjoys f.m.p.
Proof. Let logic L has a complete Jankov refutation system
R = 〈{J(Ai)−; i ∈ I} ;MT,RS,RG〉.
Assume A is a formula and A /∈ L. From the completeness of R it follows
that there is a R-inference of the meta-statement A− over L. By Lemma
4.2, for some i ∈ I formula A is invalid in Ai. Recall, that for all i ∈ I
algebra Ai is ﬁnite. Hence, logic L enjoys f.m.p.
Conversely, assume L enjoys f.m.p.. Then from f.m.p. and Theorem
3.1(Ded) it immediately follows that the negative meta-statements obtained
from the Jankov formulas of all f.s.i. algebras from Mod(L) form a set of
antiaxioms for a complete consistent refutation system for L. 
Remark 2. For intermediate logics cf. [10].
Proposition 4.4. If L is a logic that enjoys f.m.p. and has a ﬁnite
complete refutation system then L has a ﬁnite complete Jankov refutation
system.
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Proof. Assume A−1 , ..., A
−
n are all antiaxioms of a complete refuta-
tion system. Since refutation system is consistent we have Aj /∈ L for
all j = 1, . . . , n. Because L enjoys f.m.p. there are such ﬁnite alge-
bras Aj ∈ Mod(L); j = 1, . . . , n, that formula Aj is refutable in algebra
Aj ; j = 1, ..., n. Since Mod(L) forms a variety, we can safely assume that
algebras Aj are subdirectly irreducible. By virtue of Theorem 3.1(Ded),
for each j = 1, . . . , n we can replace each antiaxiom A−j with the meta-
statement J(Aj)
− and get a new consistent complete refutation system for
L. 
Let us recall that a logic L is tabular if for some ﬁnite algebra A we
have A ∈ L if and only if A  A for all formulas A. The set of algebras
{Ai; i ∈ I} is a characteristic set for L if L = ∩i∈I {A;Ai  A}. It is easy to
see that if for logic L there is a ﬁnite characteristic set of algebras, then L
is tabular: the direct product of all algebras from this set deﬁnes logic L.
Theorem 4.5. Let L be a logic that enjoys f.m.p.. Then L has a com-
plete ﬁnite refutation system if and only if it is tabular.
Proof. Assume L has a ﬁnite complete refutation system. Then by
virtue of Proposition 4.4, logic L has a ﬁnite complete Jankov refutation
system. Let
R = 〈{J(Ai)−; i = 1, . . . , n} ;MT,RS,RG〉
be a complete refutation system for L. Let us check that the set of algebras
A = {Ai; i = 1, . . . , n} is a characteristic set for logic L. Indeed, assume A
is a formula and A /∈ L. From completeness of R it follows that the meta-
statement A− is R-derivable over L. Hence, by virtue of Lemma 4.2, formula
A is invalid in some algebra from A. Thus, the set A is a characteristic set
for L and L is tabular.
Conversely, suppose L is tabular and A is a ﬁnite algebra such that for
any formula A
A  A if and only if A ∈ L.
Let
A = {A1, . . . ,An}
be the set of all (modulo isomorphism) s.i. homomorphic images of A.
Note, that any formula A is valid in A (or in L for this matter) if and only
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if formula A is valid in all algebras from A. From Theorem 3.1 (Ded) it
follows that the refutation system 〈{J(Ai)−; i = 1, . . . , n} ;MT,RS,RG〉 is
complete for logic L. 
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